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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  07-2899
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
DONOVAN ANTHONY WATSON
a/ka
ERROL ANTHONY YOUNG
a/k/a
CHAUNLEY MILLER
a/k/a
MARK SAULTER
a/k/a
OLIVER COHAIN
a/k/a
OSWALK TAIWO
a/k/a
RAYMOND WALKER,
            Donovan Anthony Watson,
                             Appellant
                                             
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 06-CR-707
District Judge: The Honorable Anita B. Brody
                                             
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 3, 2008
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges
      This Guideline range is based on an Adjusted Offense Level of 21 and a Criminal1
History Category of IV.  The findings in the PSR are not challenged by either party.
     The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Appellate2
jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  See United States v.
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2006).
2
(Filed: July 8, 2008 )
                                             
OPINION
                                             
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
On March 14, 2007, Donovan Anthony Watson, a Jamaican citizen, pleaded guilty
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to a single
count of reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and § 1326(b)(2). 
The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated Watson’s Sentencing Guideline
range as 57 to 71 months.   At sentencing, Watson urged the District Court to consider the1
fact that the Eastern District did not have a fast-track sentencing program for aliens
convicted of violating § 1326 and requested a variance below his Guideline range.  The
Court considered the absence of a fast-track sentencing program, but it declined to impose
a sentence below the Guideline range.   This timely appeal followed.2
Watson alleges that his sentence “was imposed as a result of an incorrect
application of the sentencing guidelines.”  18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(2).  Specifically, Watson
argues that the District Court did not understand its authority to vary from the Guidelines
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because of the absence of a fast-track program.  Watson
3concedes that the absence of a fast-track sentencing program is not an unwarranted
sentencing disparity under § 3553(a)(6) in light of our decision in United States v. Vargas. 
477 F.3d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he disparity between sentences in fast-track and non-
fast-track districts is authorized by Congress, and, hence, warranted.”).  Because Vargas
does not foreclose consideration of the absence of a fast-track sentencing program under §
3553(a)’s other factors, Watson argues that certain statements made by the District Court
during sentencing show that the Court believed a variance based on fast-track disparity
was only authorized under § 3553(a)(6).  The record illustrates that the District Court did
understand its authority to vary below the Guideline range.  As such, we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
Watson alleges an error similar to the one addressed by this Court in United States
v. Gunter, where we held that a district court erred by treating the Guidelines as effectively
mandatory when it did not recognize its authority to vary from the Sentencing
Commission’s crack cocaine Guideline range.  462 F.3d 237, 247-49 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Gunter involved a “non-constitutional” Booker error–where a district court fails to
recognize its authority to exercise complete discretion during its evaluation of the §
3553(a) factors.  See id. at 247.  Because this presents a question of law, our review is
plenary.  Id.
We are fully aware, however, that sentencing judges’ remarks “are unlikely to be a
perfect or complete statement of all of the surrounding law.”  United States v. Cooper, 437
4F.3d 324, 330 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Furthermore, this Court has “repeatedly held that district courts are under no obligation ‘to
routinely state by rote that they have read the Booker decision or that they know the
sentencing guidelines are now advisory.’”  Vargas, 477 F.3d at 102 (quoting Cooper, 437
F.3d at 329).
During the sentencing colloquy, the District Court “recognize[d] that the sentencing
guidelines are no longer mandatory,” and stated that it “must determine the facts
appropriate for imposing a reasonable sentence that is either a guideline sentence or a non-
guideline sentence.”  After sentencing, the District Court also commended Watson’s
counsel, Ms. Toplin, for “do[ing] an exceedingly good job in bringing up every factor that
I would possibly consider in sentencing . . . .”  Moreover, examination of the sentencing
transcript clearly illustrates that the District Court considered the totality of the
circumstances, including the § 3553(a) factors, the absence of a fast-track program, and
Watson’s personal situation.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3661. 
Watson relies heavily on the District Court’s statement, “I will take it into
consideration, but I will only take it into consideration in – in deciding where in the
guideline range I’m going to sentence you” to prove his point.  Watson’s reliance is
misplaced, however, as this statement was taken out of context and is merely an
explanation by the Court that it chose to place substantial weight on the seriousness of the
offense and Watson’s recidivism, thereby sentencing closer to the bottom of the Guideline
5range.  Because we conclude that the District Court understood its authority to impose a
sentence below the guideline range based on fast-track disparity, we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
